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Abstract
The cybersecurity community typically reacts to
attacks after they occur. Being reactive is costly and
can be fatal where attacks threaten lives, important
data, or mission success. But can cybersecurity be done
proactively? Our research capitalizes on the
Germination Period—the time lag between hacker
communities discussing software flaw types and flaws
actually being exploited—where proactive measures
can be taken. We argue for a novel proactive approach,
utilizing big data, for (I) identifying potential attacks
before they come to fruition; and based on this
identification, (II) developing preventive countermeasures. The big data approach resulted in our vision
of the Proactive Cybersecurity System (PCS), a layered,
modular service platform that applies big data
collection and processing tools to a wide variety of
unstructured data sources to predict vulnerabilities and
develop countermeasures. Our exploratory study is the
first to show the promise of this novel proactive
approach and illuminates challenges that need to be
addressed.

1. Introduction
The number and variety of cyber-attacks is rapidly
increasing, and the rate of new software vulnerabilities
is also rising dramatically. According to a recent study
“the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of detected
security incidents has increased 66% year-over-year
since 2009” [21]. But the software security community
is typically reacting to attacks after they occur. Being
reactive is costly and can be fatal, where attacks threaten
lives, important data, or mission success.
Unfortunately, existing research on cybersecurity has
focused almost exclusively on reactive strategies. Some
attempts to be “proactive”, such as in the guidelines
published by IEEE Center for Secure Design [14], have
been outlined, but these are limited to the scope of
software design and are rather abstract.
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Predictive analytics, an emerging tool being used to
identify potential cyber threats against organizations,
has the capability to be proactive but currently it is not.
The emerging predictive analytics used in the security
industry attempts to build a specific response to a
specific cybersecurity threat [26]. As attackers find new
ways to avoid detection, predictive analytics helps
security professionals find unknown malware wherever
it may be hiding. Bit predictive analytics, as it is
currently practiced, doesn’t mean seeing an attack
before it occurs [26], which is what we mean by being
“proactive”. For instance, the analytics software
company FICO, although still not “proactive” by our
definition, used predictive real-time analytics to respond
to data breaches faster than before [12]. The traditional
approach of gathering data on a compromise,
developing a threat’s “signature” and then using that
signature to protect against future threats, results in
massive time delays. FICO, in contrast, identifies threats
as they come on the scene by identifying anomalous
patterns using real-time analytics. This identification
has to build on the profiling of attacks that are currently
known. But by this time considerable damage has
already been done.
Can we be truly proactive about cybersecurity, in the
sense that we can prevent the attack before it occurs?
Can we predict what concepts that are emerging in the
hacker community will eventually evolve into a
successful exploit or an attack? These are our research
questions. Our research is on analogy with the medical
industry’s use of predictive analytics to proactively
prevent disease outbreaks. To be proactive, the disease
has to be recognized before, not after, it becomes
widespread.
In addition, continuing the medical analogy, to be
proactive, we not only look out for external attacks, e.g.,
disease outbreaks, but we also need to look internally,
in terms of an individual’s predisposition to a disease. It
has been shown [20] that a majority of security bugs—
nearly two thirds—are “foundational”; that is, they have
existed for many years in a system’s legacy code. Many
of them are, in fact, 0-day vulnerabilities, which give no
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time to plan any mitigation against their exploitation
once the flaws become known. To be proactive,
organizations must take security assurance steps after a
software product has been released, but before the broad
hacker community discovers its vulnerabilities [7].
The proactive approach, if proven feasible, would be
a game-changer for the cybersecurity community. Our
research is motivated by the enormous potential benefits
of this approach. The proactive approach is appealing,
but questions remain whether it is feasible. Our
exploratory study is the first to show the promise of this
novel proactive approach, utilizing big data, and
illuminates challenges that need to be addressed.
In what follows, we discuss the “Germination
Period”, a time lag between hacker communities
discussing software flaw types and those flaws being
exploited. Our definition of Germination Period
includes the previously identified “Honeymoon period”,
which occurs after the release of a system, but before the
identification of its first vulnerability [7]. Both of these
periods represent opportunities where proactive
counter-measures can be advantageously taken.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In
Section 3, we present our vision of a Proactive
Cybersecurity System (PCS), based on the big data
approach. In Section 4, we describe our research
framework and discuss challenges and directions for
realizing PCS. Section 5 presents our exploratory study.
Section 6 concludes with remarks for future work.

2. The Germination Period and Big Data
We first conducted a literature review on the patterns
of past cyber-attacks to help answer our research
questions. We found that the ‘black hat’ (offensive
hacker) community is a learning community with unique
ecologic properties, and we found there’s a time lag that
we called the Germination Period. This is the time
between the emergence of a vulnerability concept in the
hacker community and the creation of successful
attacks. It is during this Germination Period that we can
be proactive. For example, in May 2005, Robert
Seacord, a security specialist at the Software
Engineering Institute, published the first edition of
Secure Coding in C and C++. On page 156 of his book,
he cautioned about "referencing freed memory" [23]. In
2007, researchers from WatchFire reported a "Dangling
Pointer" vulnerability in Microsoft IIS [1] and Justin
Ferguson gave a talk at the Blackhat conference
reporting one of the first valid exploits of what became
known as Use-After-Free (UAF) [9]. Blogs and
tutorials related to the concepts of UAF began to appear
frequently around 2010. Figure 1 below shows the
reported number of common vulnerabilities and
exposures (CVEs), by year, for UAF entries. Successful

UAF attacks can have serious consequences: corruption
of data, and the execution of arbitrary code.
Clearly the offensive hacker community learned
(about UAFs) and just as clearly it takes time, from the
initial discovery of a vulnerability until it becomes a
significant and viable threat to the “white hat”
community. This time lag between 2006 to 2010, the
Germination Period, during which offensive
communities are gaining understanding and expertise
and planning exploits, represents an opportunity for
proactive counter-measures. But such counter-measures
can only be applied if the potential threat is determined
early enough.

Figure 1. Use-After-Free Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVEs)
How does the offensive community gain
understanding and expertise in planning exploits? What
traces do they leave? In our exploratory study, we have
identified two main categories of data sources
containing information leading to emerging concepts
describing vulnerabilities that are likely to be targeted:
(1) hacker communities, and (2) public security
databases. Both types of data sources discuss
vulnerabilities, PoC (Proof of Concept) exploits, and
attacks. Interestingly, we have noted that both source
types recognize occurrences of PoC exploits, attacks,
and vulnerabilities at the same time. It has been shown
that there are time delays, e.g., the Germination Period,
both between the identification of vulnerabilities and the
production of PoC exploits and also between hostile
attacks targeting these vulnerabilities and the
corresponding PoC exploits [6][23]. We intend to
broaden these data sources, thus taking a big data
approach, to show something more general, by
identifying as many contexts as possible and
determining whether the time delays are different in
different contexts.
Hackers form communities. Some of the hackers’
blogs, software repositories, IRC channels, etc. can be
found on the internet. They are learning communities
and they are innovation communities, no different from
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, researchers and even
terrorist organizations. This is why they are successful
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and why we fear them. But, mounting a successful
attack requires tremendous resources and patience.
Hacker communities, as with all innovation
communities, need to share information to be effective;
they build on each other’s work and discourse,
sometimes directly but more often indirectly [26]. By
analyzing the topics in hackers' discussions, we will be
are likely to be the focus of upcoming attacks. Early
insight can lead to early, and hence more effective,
quality assurance and mitigation strategies.able to get
early indication as to which vulnerabilities
As a result, we believe and will present early evidence
that we can mine hacker discussion forums, blogs, and
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels (e.g. freenode.net,
AnonOps IRC, Metasploit IRC, Google Project Zero,
blackhat.com, GMANE.org, seclists.org) to identify
emerging concepts. In this way the software security
community can be more proactive in detecting and
eliminating vulnerabilities, rather than simply reacting
to vulnerabilities as they occur. For example, the
Heartbleed bug was discovered simultaneously by
(defensive) security researchers at Google and at
Codenomicon, avoiding potentially huge losses if
hackers had found this bug first (in April, 2014 more
than 2/3 of the world’s web servers were vulnerable to
Heartbleed).
In addition, our exploratory study has already mined
publicly available vulnerability, exploit, and attack

databases such as CVEs (cve.mitre.org), CVE Details
(cvedetails.com), and the Open Web Application
Security Project's (OWASP) WASC Web Hacking
Incidents
Database
(WHID)
(https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WASC_
Web_Hacking_Incidents_Database_Project) to create
an initial ontology of prominent security concepts.
There are also important differences between these
two types of data sources. By collecting data from
various sources, we can assemble information about
different aspects of the same vulnerabilities and
exploits. This means that such differences can be
combined and compared for better understanding of the
conditions responsible for the time delays between
vulnerabilities and exploits—a distinct advantage of
utilizing big data.

3. Proactive Cybersecurity System (PCS)
Vision
Our big data approach results in a vision of the
Proactive Cybersecurity System (PCS) as shown in
Figure 1. Grounded on a wide variety of unstructured
big data sources, the PCS has two goals:
Goal I: identify potential attacks before they take
place and cause harm, and based on this identification,
Goal II: develop preventive counter-measures.

Figure 2. Proactive Security System
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To achieve Goal I, a Targeted Vulnerability
Prediction (TVP) subsystem detects, from hackers' ad
hoc communities and publicly available security
sources, the emerging concepts that are the early
warning signs of likely vulnerability targets.
To
achieve Goal II, (a) an Architectural Vulnerability
Detection (AVD) subsystem and (b) a Risk Analysis and
Recommender (RAR) subsystem were designed. AVD
adds a further capability of predicting the impact of the
attack vectors identified in the TVP subsystem on a
system architecture of a company. RAR analyzes the
risks associated with identified vulnerabilities, estimate
the costs of mitigation actions, and recommend
refactoring and assurance strategies. The TVP, AVD,
and RAR subsystems constitute the PCS, a modular
service platform that combines data sources, data
collection and processing tools, metrics and models for
use of security personnel, researchers, governments, and
insurance companies.

4. Research Framework and Challenges
Figure 3 shows our research framework for
developing a PCS. We will discuss the research steps,
analytical foundations, tools employed as well as the
preliminary results for achieving Goal I and Goal II.
As shown in Figure 3, for TVP our research steps
include (1) identifying big data sources; (2) collecting
and managing big data; (3) identifying emerging
concepts; (4) tracking concept evolution; and (5)
prioritizing vulnerabilities. In parallel, we develop
internal proactive measures for an organization by the
AVD and RAR subsystems. Next we describe our
preliminary directions and illuminate the challenges to
be addressed in each step.

Figure 3. PCS Research Framework

4.1

Identify Big Data Sources

Inherent in the big data approach, identifying and
assessing the data sources is a critical activity as the
subsequent analysis and proactive measures rely on the
quality, comprehensiveness, and reliability of the data.
There are many potential data sources available and
different data sources have different characteristics and
provide different information. For instance, one

important difference is that most of the public security
databases do not provide information about who
contributed an entry to the database. Hacker sources do
typically identify who is making a contribution. In many
cases, however, the names provided are fanciful and an
individual may not use the same designation in different
chats, lists and database contributions.
Furthermore, publicly accessible online databases
are maintained by various organizations. MITRE’s CVE
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database collects vulnerability, exploit and attack
information. An offshoot of this is CVE Details. This
website identifies vulnerability and corresponding
exploit types for which advanced searching can be done.
This data can be tabulated showing frequencies of
instances of vulnerability or exploit types on a yearly
basis. This tabularized data can also show the frequency
of exploits across all types also on a yearly basis. We
have already explored some of this data, and patterns
have emerged. In most cases, there are spikes in certain
years in the number of recognized vulnerabilities. In
some cases, the changes from one year to another can be
as great as 1000 occurrences.
Similar variations and spikes in frequency are seen in
data on exploits, both PoC and hostile. This information
can be mined from CVEs, CVE Details, the exploit
databases, and the WHID. As with the vulnerability
frequency data, the frequency of occurrence of PoC
exploits and attacks changes over time. Determining the
root causes for such patterns, particularly the spikes, is
one of our research goals. We may find that some
attacks come prior to PoC exploits and close in time to
the discovery of a vulnerability, perhaps even before its
discovery. In such cases initial attacks would not be
preventable. Even if we don’t find the requisite events
or conditions that occur enough before all attacks, the
events and conditions we do find will enable us to make
predictions about a spike in attacks that we can mitigate.
In addition to keeping track of instances of
vulnerabilities, exploits and attacks, we also have to
keep track of what category in the ontology they are
instances of. We may find, for example, that while
instances are increasing in a high-level category, they
are only increasing in certain sub-categories, and not
others. It is these specific increasing subcategories that
provide a basis for mitigation strategies.
There are several challenges here. Exploit databases
typically have much more extensive coverage of
exploits than the CVE Details website. Also, the
WHID’s collection of attack instances is much smaller
than the true number since organizations are often
reluctant to acknowledge that they have been attacked.
Because of these and other discrepancies among the data
sources, our analyses will not treat any source as
definitive. We will instead triangulate over several data
sources, and in the TVP module we will generate a
confidence score for the predictions, depending on the
extent to which trends discovered in multiple data
sources are compatible.

4.2 Collecting and Managing Data
Collecting and managing this big, unstructured data
presents significant challenges. Quantifying instances
of vulnerabilities and exploits is currently done through

numerous manual searches, laboriously selecting and
counting entries. One of our goals is to automate this
process as much as possible, although we realize that a
human will always be “in the loop”, as indicated in
Figure 2. We will utilize existing web spider technology
to collect data from hacker forums. Also, we have
gained substantial experience in network evolution
visualization and successfully developed web-scraping
and crowdsourcing tools, which will be core modules
for data collection and management. Large volumes and
different varieties of data will have to be collected from
the main data sources, ingested, stored and prepared for
analysis. A big data repository is thus planned for
storing the raw data to allow “schema on read” [5][6]
for different types of analysis. There are tremendous
technical challenges in terms of preparing data for
analysis. The data cleaning and integration is not a
trivial task [6].

4.3 Identifying Emerging Concepts
Accurately identifying emerging concepts is critical to
the success of PCS. To address the inherent complexity
of the data collected, we are employing text mining,
concept clustering and sentiment analysis techniques to
identify: 1) emerging concepts against the background
of more prominent and lasting ones; and 2) emerging
hacker communities associated with the emerging
concepts. Because of the huge amount of data involved,
manual curation will not be possible in general, and so
PCS needs to aid and guide a human analyst who will
make the final interpretation and decision to develop
countermeasures.
For 1), we are primarily applying text mining
(extracting and clustering noun phrases [3]), concept
clustering and mapping, and ontological analysis to
identify and track concepts. The text mining results will
provide continuous input for the concept clustering,
mapping and sentiment analysis phase and together they
will provide results for inclusion into an evolving
ontology. Ontology building is done manually at the
moment, but we are investigating ways to automate as
much of this as possible.
For 2), the tasks are: a) elaborate the structure and
evolution of hacker communities by analyzing their
network structures; and b) determine which of the
emerging concepts are not only likely vulnerabilities but
which are likely targets of attacks and hence worthy of
attention by a human analyst.
For concept clustering, mapping and sentiment
analysis, we are employing the Leximancer tool
(leximancer.com). Leximancer analyzes the frequencies
and co-occurrence relationships between words in a text
corpus and produces concept maps that show and name
the significant concepts in the corpus. Leximancer also
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shows the relationships among the most significant
concepts used in a text corpus, including those that
express sentiment [16][24]. It enables rapid analysis of
tens of thousands or more text entries in records like
those collected in Gmane or CVE List, but also allows
modulation of the results through researcher
intervention and interpretation. As an example, a portion

of the concept map from a completed automated
analysis of the entire CVE List circa August 2015 is
shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: CVE Concept Map

4.4

Tracking Concept Evolution

We iteratively perform three interrelated processes to
mine concepts and track their changes. The concepts to
be mined and tracked cover conditions leading to the
identification of vulnerabilities and exploits (both nonhostile and hostile) along with a characterization of the
vulnerabilities and exploits themselves and their
classification. The characterization differentiates, and
the classification relates, the individuals, groups,
communities and organizations, the systems and
applications, and the processes, methods and techniques
involved. The three processes are:
1) mining security data sources using nounphrase parsing, automated terminology
construction, statistical analysis and clustering
to determine the most salient concepts [16] in
the corpora being analyzed and track their
changes through time;
2) mapping the relationships among these
concepts and also tracking their changes
through time, employing Leximancer. This
will generate a series of maps representing the
changing networks of the most prominent,
relevant, and important concepts mined,

including concepts representing both positive
and negative sentiments;
3) building a security ontology [17][19][9], that
we call the Emergent Vulnerabilities and
Exploits Ontology (EVEO), based on the
results of 1) and 2) that will help guide the
construction and tracking of emerging
concepts.
One challenge is to compare a series of maps, and to
view the changing state of the ontology over time.
However, we have already identified a promising
candidate technology, TopicFlow, to aid us in
visualizing topics and topic evolution [25].

4.5

Prioritizing Vulnerabilities

Not all vulnerabilities are of the same value. We have
identified two approaches to help prioritize identified
vulnerabilities. One is using machine learning to
determine the characteristics of a “high priority”
vulnerability. We will perform retrospective case
studies as training sets for the machine learning. The
other is to apply ecology theory [13] to help identify
emerging concepts, refine the categorization, and
prioritize the vulnerabilities. Two processes coexist in
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each concept's community: symbiosis and competition.
As more and more participants join a community, their
symbiosis allows them to coexist in the community,
through collaboration and cooperation. At the same
time, as more and more participants are in the
community, they may face increasing competition with
each other. Accordingly, the density of a community is
used as an indicator for both symbiosis and competition
among individual participants.
We will identify, as far as possible, the participants in
the hacker discussion forums, blogs, and IRC channels
who contributed to or commented on the topics and
concepts detected. The participants for each concept
will be considered as a community for that concept. If
two participants contributed content to the same concept
in one of the venues or they commented on each other's
contributions, then there is a relation between them.
Based on these participants and relationships, we are
able to build a network for each concept for any period
of time. To assess the impact of ecology on the evolution
of concepts, at the community level, we will apply the
density-dependence model [13] to explain the vital rates
of concept communities (e.g., entry, growth, and exit
rates). Using a technique of text mining—sentiment
analysis—we will also be able to associate rates of entry
with different sentiments, thus enhancing our
understanding of concept trajectory and momentum.

4.6

Developing Countermeasures

The AVD and RAR subsystems will enable internal
proactive measures for an organization, taking
advantage of the Germination Period. For a specific
organization producing software the Germination
Period will be a short window of opportunity after their
software product has been released, but before the
hacker community discovers its vulnerabilities.
Currently, there exist few proactive methods. As
aforementioned, it has been shown [20] that a majority
of
security
bugs—nearly
two
thirds—are
“foundational.” Taken together with the Germination
Period, these observations suggest that one cannot
simply try to find all of the security bugs in a system,
but rather must take a strategic, risk-driven approach to
security assurance. For this reason, we are constructing
a cybersecurity countermeasures approach, extending
the existing tools and methods:
1) Driven by input (e.g. candidate emerging
vulnerabilities) from the TVP subsystem, we will
analyze the architecture of individual systems, using the
Architecture Analysis for Security (AAFS) method [22]
to understand the risks posed by these vulnerabilities;
The AAFS method grew out of existing architecture
analysis techniques, such as the architecture tradeoff
analysis method (ATAM) [8], but focuses solely on

security. The rationale behind architectural analysis is
that discovering design problems during coding or
maintenance is too late, because addressing these
problems later in the life cycle is costly, risky, and
disruptive to a project. At the point in a project’s
lifecycle when a software architecture has been
established, but before much code has been written, the
architecture can be analyzed for risks [2].
2) A toolcalled Titan [28] will be used to identify
architectural structures that are potentially implicated in
the targeted vulnerabilities, to locate the design flaws
within these structures, and to identify the specific files
within these structures that have the highest probability
of experiencing a security bug. The Titan tool chain
takes, as input, a project’s source code, its revision
history (from a configuration management tool such as
SVN), and its issues (from an issue-tracking system
such as Jira) and, based on this input, clusters the
architecture into a set of overlapping DRSpaces. These
DRSpaces are then analyzed for architectural flaws—
anti-patterns that we call hotspots. These hotspots have
been shown to be highly correlated with bugs, changes,
and churn [17]. And we have discovered that these
results hold for security as well [10]. That is, when a file
is implicated in architectural flaws, it is significantly
more likely to be involved in a security bug. The more
flaws a file is implicated in, the greater the probability
that the file will experience security problems.
3) Using the knowledge from 1) and 2), the RAR
subsystem will propose refactoring solutions to the
architectures, based on removing the design flaws
[15][17]. AAFS and Titan techniques serve to identify
the risks in the system. To actually remove these risks,
the system under scrutiny needs to be fixed and often
this requires refactoring, to remove the identified
hotspots. While it is true that many bugs are caused by
pure coding errors, our Titan-based results suggest that
architectural flaws play a large role in increasing the
frequency of security bugs. Thus, no simple coding
solution will fix this problem. The only way to fix it is
to refactor the architecture, to remove the flaws.
Fortunately, we have the necessary information to do
just that. The Titan tool identifies not only flawed parts
of the architecture, but also the reasons for the flaws and
the precise set of files implicated.

4. Exploratory Study
We have conducted a retrospective exploratory study
to gauge the feasibility of the proactive cybersecurity
approach and the TVP design. We analyzed both the
Gmane
“Full-Disclosure”
email
list
(http://dir.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.fulldisclosu
re) and the CVE database for comparison. We wanted to
see the differences between the contents of the hacker
mailing list and the CVE database for purposes of
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characterizing already recognized vulnerabilities and
identifying and characterizing emerging ones. The
Gmane list, which covers 2010 to 2015, is well over 250
MB. It contains a lot of noise including binary code,
source code and boilerplate information (such as
advertisements for security products and services) that
can be repeated thousands of times, but contribute little,
if any, useful information. Cleansing such files is part of
our text mining process.
Our initial approach was to extract and mine the
contents of the Subject and Date fields. There were over
22,000 Subject and Date fields. We found similarities
and differences in the coverage of DLL hijacking when
we analyzed the two data sources. Additional
information about product targets found in hacker
discussions was not found in CVE database contents.
The additional information that hacker discussions
provide increases the potential for preventing or
reducing attacks on these targets crucial for an early
warning model relevant to attacks on these targets.
Conversely, the relationships among DLL Hijacking on
the one hand and Trojan Horse, local users, gaining
privileges, untrusted search path vulnerabilities, and
executing arbitrary code on the other are, in fact, the
primary considerations in the CVE entries. Knowing
these relationships is an important part of understanding
how DLL Hijacking attacks are performed and what
kinds of targets they are likely to aim for.
In short, the two data sources (Gmane and CVE)
supplement one another. Both sources are needed for an
early warning model that prevents attacks or mitigates
their numbers. The retrospective case study re-enforces
the importance of 1) identifying and integrating
information from various data
sources and 2)
determining what information can be indicative of
emerging vulnerabilities, new forms of exploit, or the
(types of) targets of future attacks.
For example, in analyzing the text of “Full
Disclosure” for 2009 we can see that DLL is an
important concept, but “hijack” that has not emerged as
a concept. There are other, however, potentially relevant
concepts that are clustered close to DLL, such as
“bypass” and “exploitation”, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Concept Clusters from 2009 “Full
Disclosure”
Using our ontology, however, we can attempt to
“seed” the concept clustering process. An analysis of the
same “Full Disclosure” list for 2009, but with seeding,
shows DLL and “hijack” in a single cluster, as shown in
Figure 6.

Figure 6: 2009 “Full Disclosure” with Seeding
Finally, in 2010, we can see that DLL and hijacking
appear clustered together, as shown in Figure 7, and
distinct from other attack types such as SQL injection.
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execution attack or a local-code execution attack.
Assuming that an exploit of a vulnerability is to make it
part of a viable method for attacking a system, if we find
an exploit but not a corresponding attack, this might be
an early warning sign that the corresponding attack is
imminent.

6. Conclusions and Future Work

Figure 7: Concept Clusters from 2010 “Full
Disclosure”
This case study demonstrates the two major
components of the TVP module of PCS: text mining and
concept clustering. Together they aid an analyst in
identifying potential categories (types), subcategories,
their characteristics and relations, all elements of an
ontology. Building a useful PCS ontology requires
keeping track not only of all the concepts that have been
discovered, as well as their associated characteristics
and relationships at every level of the concept hierarchy,
but also a way of keeping track of when people became
aware of the concepts and when their corresponding
instances occur. Having a way of keeping track of these
correspondences is crucial, and this is precisely what the
PCS ontology is designed to do. There are other reasons
why building an ontology is critical. The hierarchical
and relational structure of the categories provide
blueprints of how new categories are derived from
existing categories. This could be the basis for detecting
emerging concepts.
For example, using text mining results from the FullDisclosure list, we found that there are occurrences of
terms standing for concepts like SQL-injection, XSSinjection and SQL and XSS-injection. Since we also
found HTML-injection, might we find HTML and XSSinjection? In fact, we did find this. However, if we did
not, this would put us on the lookout for it—a proactive
measure. Also, for sibling categories like remote code
execution and local code execution, if a code execution
exploit or a code execution attack has been identified,
we would look for a remote-code execution exploit or a
local-code execution exploit and a remote-code

In this paper, we have explored the idea of a
proactive approach to cybersecurity and shown
promising progress towards this goal. We have
identified an opportunity in the Germination Period,
which is the time-period during which proactive
measures may be most advantageously taken, and we
have shown that a proactive approach to cybersecurity,
utilizing big data, holds enormous potential. We also
contributed the design of the Proactive Cybersecurity
System, which serves as a research framework, and
illuminates a number of research and practical
challenges that need to be addressed. Big data is the
predictive analytics foundation for the PCS. The PCS
rests on a big data infrastructure for extracting
information from hackers’ communities and security
data sources, transforming (cleansing) and loading the
data, clustering and visualizing it, and curating it for
future use. Our first exploratory retrospective study
showed significant potential as a training set for
machine learning. We are currently developing more
retrospective studies and heuristics for machine learning
and hope to develop the full PCS as envisioned.
A proactive approach to cybersecurity will be a
game-changer. If successful, we expect our eventual
research results will guide quality assurance and risk
mitigation activities, allowing the security assurance
community to be proactive rather than reactive.
Although security assurance personnel must have been
doing some of this already, they currently do so in an ad
hoc fashion, based on their personal experience. Thus
they are operating without proper decision support and
with limited, typically organization-internal data. These
existing efforts will be significantly enhanced by the
PCS.
We must stress that the challenges that we have
already encountered are not trivial. The data to be
collected is vast and poorly structured, and the analysis
is complex. We are truly looking for needles among
haystacks. But in view of the enormous benefits that
may be achieved by the proactive approach, we are
compelled to share our preliminary results, hoping to
engage broader participation and collaboration for
building a proactive cybersecurity community and
realizing the PCS vision.
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